

15 May 1978

X1 MEMORANDUM FOR:

[redacted]
Deputy Director, National Intelligence
Tasking Office

X1 FROM

[redacted]
Chief, Requirements & Evaluation Staff

SUBJECT : Management of I&W

1. These are some thoughts on para II C 1 of Dick Lehman's outline.

2. The assumption in all of our discussions is that the DCI has the responsibility for organizing an I&W system to serve as the focal point for all I&W systems designed to provide warning of events likely to involve US forces or to threaten the security of the United States. This assumption clearly subsumes the concept of "big W" or strategic warning. The assumption, although less clearly, also subsumes some movement along a continuum toward "little W" or warning of localized conflicts.

3. We have not addressed it in our discussions but, we must take into account the presence of I&W functions in several elements of the USG at the national level, both inside and outside the Intelligence Community. These I&W functions are sometimes clearly labeled as is the Strategic Warning Staff. Although not so clearly labeled, the NMCC also serves both strategic and localized warning functions by reflecting the actions and reactions of US forces in proximity to deployed foreign forces and local foreign events. Each of the Unified and Specified Commands, and their subordinate elements, have intelligence oriented I&W activities designed to feed information through DoD communications to DIA and thus into the National Intelligence Community.

X1
[redacted]
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

4. The preceding paragraphs allude to the complexity of observers, communications, organizations, and jurisdictions included in I&W activities. It is a complex maze that originates in the responsibility of various organizational entities to give warning. It is unlikely that we will ever consolidate these functions under a single authority. Indeed, it would be dangerous at this time to even try. We must, however, seek a way to draw upon this maze of activity and data in order to develop a coherent analysis at the national level of what is happening in the I&W world.

5. The command line between the DCI and his own I&W organization must be clear so that there is no confusion about the interests of theaters, commands, or departments. There must also be Intelligence Community cooperation to permit the I&W organization to draw upon resources that are outside the NFIP. The psychology of bureaucracy dictates some Community oversight as a price for the cooperation. It appears to be a reasonable exchange. The problem will be to provide the Community oversight without cluttering the command line.

6. The DCI obviously cannot devote sufficient time for direct control and management of I&W activity. On the other hand, it will be difficult for him to delegate the authority to manage I&W without descending from the lofty levels of national command lines into competing departmental and intra-departmental levels of conflicting command lines. There are at least three solutions; another national level individual with command authority, a national level committee to manage I&W, or a combination of these concepts.

7. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence has command authority explicit in his office. That authority could be strengthened by a specific delegation of authority by the DCI. A second alternative would be to form a national level committee, composed of the D/DCI/NI, the D/DCI/CT, the D/INR, and D/DIA under the chairmanship of the DDCI. The third alternative would be to form the committee as an advisory or consultative body to the DDCI who would exercise command authority over the I&W organization.

8. The internal staffing of the I&W organization should reflect clear responsibility to the DCI, or his agent the DDCI. This requires that the head of the I&W organization be appointed by the DCI. The staff of the I&W organization should be composed of nominees from all elements of the Intelligence Community. The I&W staff should be analytical specialists with considerable experience in the areas where the warning activity is focused. The infrequent requirement to adjust collection activity in support

SECRET

of the I&W effort argues against having numerous collection specialists assigned to the I&W organization on a full-time basis. The collection tasking staff could provide support to the I&W staff through one of its NITO teams whenever adjustment of collection resources would be necessary. The NITO team also could assist the head of the I&W organization in the continuous projects to improve I&W targeting methodologies.

cc: Vincent Heyman
Richard Lehman

SECRET